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“The Different Sets of Ideas at the Back of our Heads”: Dissent and 
Authority at the International Court of Justice 
Hemi Mistry* 
We spent hours and hours and days in that committee discussing subjects where the 
only difference was not in our discussion or in what we were saying but in a different 
set of ideas in the back of our heads1 
Introduction 
Commenting upon the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’)’s judgment in Oil Platforms, Jorg 
Kammerhofer expressed regret at the number of individual opinions attached to the Court’s judgment. 
Opining that ‘[t]he appending of individual opinions simply is not healthy’, he lamented the negative 
effect that the publication of such opinions have on the authority of the Court and its judgments.2 
Kammerhofer is not alone in holding this view, nor was he the first to express it.3 At the same time, 
supporters of the right of judges to issue individual opinions assert their complementary – even 
constitutive – relationship with institutional authority.4 Despite the longevity of the theoretical debate 
as to the desirability of permitting additional opinions (individual opinions and joint opinions),5 
existing attempts to address this disagreement fall short of offering a resolution.6 The differences in 
the attitudes towards additional opinions (AOs) is commonly attributed to the different approaches 
traditionally adopted within the civil law and common law traditions.7 Assuming that it is possible to 
identify uniform ‘civil law’ and ‘common law’ approaches,8 few ask specifically why those traditions 
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1 E. Root, Men and Policies: Addresses (1925) at 400, reflecting upon the negotiations of the Advisory Committee for the drafting of the PCIJ 
Statute.  
2 J. Kammerhofer, ‘Oil’s Well That Ends Well? Critical Comments on the Merits Judgement in the Oil Platforms Case’ (2004) 17 LJIL 695, 716. 
3 See Section 1. 
4 See Section 4. 
5 For explanation of this choice of nomenclature, see Section 1.1. 
6 Undoubtedly, the most significant and nuanced account of the institutional function of additional opinions at the ICJ has been provided by 
G. Hernández, The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Function (2014), at Chapter 4. 
7 Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan), Judgment of 18 August 1972 [1972] ICJ Rep 46 (Judge De Castro, 
Separate Opinion), at 116; I.-Hussein,-Dissenting-and-Separate-Opinions-at-the-World-Court-(1984), 5-7 and 263-4; F. Jhabvala, The 
Development and Scope of Individual Opinions in the International Court of Justice (1977); R.-Kolb,-The-International-Court-of-Justice-(2013), 
1012; G. Sluiter, ‘Unity and Division in Decision Making – The Law and Practice on Individual Opinions at the ICTY’ in B. Swart, A. Zahar and G. 
Sluiter (eds) The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (2011), 193. E. Dumbauld, ‘Dissenting Opinions in 
International Adjudication’ (1942) 90 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 929, 929-934.  
8 The civil law/common law dichotomy being a blunt comparative instrument even in the context of Western domestic legal systems alone, 
see P. Legrand, ‘The Same and Different’ in P. Legrand and R. Munday (eds) Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (2003), 243-
245, E. Örücü, ‘General View of ‘Legal Families’ and of ‘Mixing Systems’ in E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds) Comparative Law: A Handbook (2007), 
and generally, K. Zweigart and H. Kölz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (1998). On the matter of individual opinions there is no uniform 
approach towards individual opinions across European civil law jurisdictions, with some – from the Napoleonic civil law tradition maintaining 
a strict prohibition, whereas others from the Romano-Germanic tradition permitting them in certain circumstances. For an overview of the 
approach of EU Member States, see R. Raffaelli, ‘Dissenting Opinions in the Supreme Courts of the Member States’ (2012) European 
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have taken the approach that they do.9 Even fewer engage in a sustained critique of the extension of 
the assumptions associated with those traditions to the international sphere(s), which is after all 
neither. One writer avoids the apparent impasse between the civil law and common law traditions by 
diverting attention to particular characteristics of international law that may work in favour of either 
permitting or prohibiting AOs.10 However, there has been no attempt to break that impasse and, 
despite many critics observing that dissent undermines the authority of a given court or tribunal and 
its decisions, only one writer has attempted to offer an explanation how dissent offends judicial 
authority.11 My objective in this paper is to fill this gap in the existing literature and to offer a way 
forward in the debate as to the relationship between judicial dissent and judicial authority; one that 
is not hamstrung by the ‘different sets of ideas at the back of our heads’. In this paper I offer a 
contextually coherent and contextually contingent understanding of the theory and practice of AOs at 
the ICJ upon which engagement with this ubiquitous practice – by judges, scholars and practitioners – 
can be premised. 
Thus, while the focus of this paper is upon AOs at the ICJ – a practice that, in the wider scheme of 
international law may be considered a narrow subject of enquiry – the significance of this paper is 
much broader. Firstly, any actor who engages with the jurisprudence of the Court is confronted with 
the multiplicity of opinions that accompany the judgment, order or advisory opinion of the Court. The 
interpretation of the significance of those opinions will – to varying degrees – be influenced by those 
different sets of ideas at the backs of their heads. While scholars of the ICJ and those closely involved 
in the Court’s activities may have a greater understanding of how such opinions should be understood, 
the Court’s audience is broader and encompasses a range of substantive areas, owing to its systemic 
role and its general jurisdiction. Secondly, AOs (and their relationship with judicial authority) 
constitute a frame through which the nature of ICJ authority more generally can be scrutinised. While 
here, the specific purpose of our analysis of institutional authority is to situate AOs within that 
authority, the understanding of the nature of that authority that is developed can inform how we 
think about other aspects of judicial procedure and practice. Thirdly, the theoretical framework 
presented in this paper is of relevance to other (international) courts and tribunals. When applied to 
those institutional contexts it may assist our understanding of how aspects of their judicial practice 
and procedure – whether that be the practice of delivering AOs or other practices – fit within the 
particular structure of authority therein. 
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In the first half of this paper I will focus upon the authority-based critiques of AOs and demonstrate 
how they are premised upon an understanding of the nature and structure of judicial authority that is 
not reflected in the ICJ. Using Mirjan Damaška’s analytical framework for the comparative study of 
justice systems,12 I will demonstrate that rather than being a ‘hierarchically’ organised system, 
wherein AOs are inconsistent with the structure of authority, the ICJ is more accurately characterised 
as a ‘coordinately’ structured system. Within coordinately structured systems, not only are AOs 
consistent with institutional authority but can also be constitutive of it. I will use the remainder of this 
paper to articulate a theory of the institutional function of AOs the ICJ, explaining along the way why 
authority-based critiques are misconceived when made in the ICJ context. At the core of this theory is 
the notion that absent the institutional checks and balances upon the exercise of judicial power that 
exist within hierarchically structured systems,13 AOs within coordinately structured systems such as 
the ICJ constitute an essential mechanism by which the parameters of the Court’s authority for any 
given function can be appraised and established. Thus, to the extent that authority-based criticisms 
proclaim the existence of a tension between the authority of the individual judge (manifested in their 
individual opinion) and the authority of the institution (manifested in the Court’s judgment) they are 
accurate. However, to characterise the existence of this tension as negative per se is misguided. More 
accurately, the relationship between AOs and Court judgments outlined here mirrors the dynamic 
between the individual judge and the collective in the context of the Court’s internal deliberations and 
judgment drafting. 
Having explained the importance of AOs to the structural integrity of the Court’s authority, I will close 
this paper by highlighting the role of various stakeholders when engaging with that practice to ensure 
that their institutional function is discharged. I call upon both judges and participants in the 
international law-interpreting communities to exercise greater mindfulness of both the institutional 
functions of AOs and their responsibilities when engaging with that practice to ensure that those 
functions are properly discharged. 
1. “Additional Opinions” and “Judicial Authority” 
Before addressing the authority-based criticisms of AOs and explaining why their application to the 
ICJ is misguided, to avoid the same ambiguities that plague existing discourse around AOs I will outline 
what I mean when referring to the concepts of ‘additional opinions’ and ‘judicial authority’. 
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1.1. Additional Opinions 
Additional opinions are an established and familiar aspect of the international jurisprudential 
landscape. They are written texts attached to a court’s decision under a plethora of familiar labels: 
‘dissenting opinions’, ‘separate opinions’, ‘minority opinions’, ‘individual opinions’, and ‘declarations’. 
They can be authored by individual judges or jointly, by two or more judges.14 ICJ judges have confined 
the labels they use to those found in the Court’s Statute and Rules of Procedure (English-language and 
French-language as appropriate). Thus, ICJ AOs exist under the English-language labels of ‘dissenting 
opinions’, ‘separate opinions’, and ‘declarations’.15 Irrespective of the label assigned to them, all AOs 
share the purpose of being a platform upon which judges can express their personal views on aspects 
of a case, as distinct from the view of ‘the Court’, as manifested by the Court’s decision. 
The right to issue AOs is enshrined in the Court’s Statute.16 The culture of practice that has crystallised 
around that right interprets it as being broad and discretionary. The consequent polyphonic nature17 
of the Court’s jurisprudence has become one of its defining characteristics. AOs are – in practice and 
not without controversy – used to address any matter of law, fact or policy that the authoring judge(s) 
deem(s) to have been raised by the case or decision at hand and pertinent to addressing and resolving 
the issues raised by the dispute as understood by the authoring judge. While the majority of AOs 
issued are used to offer focused responses to particular aspects of the Court’s judgment, there is a 
tradition among some judges to use their individual opinions to issue lengthy and comprehensive 
alternative judgments or wide ranging and general discussions of areas of law raised by the dispute at 
hand.18 There has been judicial and non-judicial support for confining the use of AOs to explaining the 
authoring judge’s disagreement or departure from the Court’s judgment,19 or limiting the content of 
the opinion to the ‘framework of the Court’s opinion’.20 The most extensive elaboration of this latter 
‘restrictive theory’ of AOs was elaborated by then President Sir Percy Spender in response to the 9 
AOs attached to the Court’s highly contentious second phase judgment in South West Africa.21 While 
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17 Or, more accurately in some cases, ‘cacaphonic’ nature. 
18 On the current bench, the opinions of Judge Cançado Trindade would be a prime example of such opinions. Previously, Judge Alvarez held 
the view that it was necessary for at least one of the judges to provide an extensive review of all the legal issues raised by the case. See Corfu 
Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania) Merits, Judgment of 9 April 1949 [1949] ICJ Rep 4 (Judge Alvarez, Separate Opinion), at 39. 
19 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) Counter-Claims, Judgement of 6 November 2003 [2003] ICJ Rep 161 
(Judge Higgins, Separate Opinion) at para.29 and H. Thirlway, The International Court of Justice (2016), 145. 
20 South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) Second Phase, Judgment of 18 July 1966 [1966] ICJ Rep 6 (President Sir 
Percy Spender, Declaration). 
21 Ibid. 
5 
this theory gained some traction at the time,22 the view was met with strong opposition by those 
judges whose opinions President Spender’s theory would preclude, on the basis that to limit AOs in 
this way would prevent judges from expressing their disagreement with the fundamental logic of the 
Court’s judgment.23 Consequently, while there may be a cultural preference for limited opinions, in 
the spirit of accepting minority perspectives, judges have remained free to use their opinions however 
they wish. 
AOs have been issued in connection to all forms of Court decision: merits and preliminary judgments, 
advisory opinions, and orders. The labels attached to AOs are typically associated with a spectrum of 
disagreement,24 with dissenting opinions on one end of that spectrum and representing the strongest 
degree of disagreement, declarations on the other,25 and separate opinions somewhere in the 
middle.26 However, the accuracy of such a linear conceptualisation of the typology of AOs should be 
questioned. The determination of where on that spectrum a given AO lies rests with the individual 
author, and factors that may influence their labelling choice typically include the nature, scope and 
intensity of the disagreement expressed in their AO.27 Some opinions may consist of aspects that are 
conventionally understood as ‘dissenting’ in character and aspects that conventionally understood as 
‘declaratory’ or ‘separate’ in nature.28 Moreover, additional non-substantive factors may also 
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Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 5 February 1970 [1970] ICJ Rep 3 (Judge Tanaka, Separate 
Opinion). 
24 On the ‘general’ understanding of the different types of opinions connoted by their, see Thirlway supra note 19, at 144. 
25 Although the ICJ Rules of Court suggest that the purpose of declarations is for bare statements of assent or dissent (Arts. 95(2) and 107(3), 
it is common practice for judges to issue substantive, and sometimes lengthy, opinions under the label of ‘declaration’. 
26 Even conceived so broadly, one could argue with this conception; with some of the most profound disagreements with the Court’s judgment 
found in AOs labelled as ‘declarations’. For example, see Judge Buergenthal’s ‘dissent’ (p.240) from the Wall Advisory Opinion, contained in a 
self-styled Declaration: Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004 
[2004] ICJ Rep 136 (Judge Buergenthal, Declaration). Similarly, the recent Joint Declaration by Judges Tomka, Gaja and Gevorgian while 
‘declaration’ in name, is in substance an explanation of why the authors were unable vote with the Court (something conventionally 
understood to be a dissenting opinions): see Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of racial Discrimination 
(Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Request for Provisional Measures, Order of 23 July 2018 (not yet published) (Judges Tomka, Gaja and 
Gevorgian, Joint Declaration). 
27 G. Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: General Principles and Substantive Law’ (1950) 27 BYBIL 1, at 
1-2 R. Hofmann and T. Laubner, ‘Article 57’ in A. Zimmermann et al (Eds) The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary 
(2012), 1387-1388. 
28 Whereas within other courts and tribunals judges some judges have attempted to inject some nuance in their labelling choice by labelling 
their opinions as ‘partially dissenting and separate opinion’, judges at the ICJ have not taken this approach. Some judges have, however, issued 
multiple distinct opinions alongside the same judgment (either two individual opinions or contributing to a joint opinion in addition to an 
individual opinion). Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) Judgment of 11 September 
1992 [1992] ICJ Rep 350 (Judge Oda, Declaration; Judge Oda, Dissenting Opinion), and Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland 
and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway) Judgment of 14 June 1993 [1993] ICJ Rep 38 (Vice-President Oda, Declaration; Vice-President Oda, 
Separate Opinion); Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean and Land Boundary in the Northern Part of Islas Portillos 
(Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment of 2 February 2018 (not yet published) (Judge ad hoc Al-Khasawneh, Dissenting Opinion; Judge ad hoc Al-
Khasawneh, Declaration); Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia Beyond 200 Nautical Miles 
from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia) Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 17 March 2016 [2016] ICJ Rep 100 (Vice-President 
Yusuf, Judges Cançado-Trindade, Xue, Gaja, Bhandari, Robinson, and Judge ad hoc Brower, Joint Dissenting Opinion; Judge Gaja, 
Declaration;Judge Bhandari, Declaration; Judge Robinson, Declaration; Judge ad hoc Brower, Declaration); Construction of a Road in Costa 
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influence the choice that judges make.29 For these reasons, the line between different categories of 
opinions has been described by one former judge of the Court as ‘indeterminate’.30 While the nature 
of the disagreement expressed will almost certainly have implications for institutional authority, and 
while the labels ascribed to AOs may themselves have implications for institutional authority through 
what they connote,31 labels alone are of limited reliability as objective descriptors of the substantive 
nature of the disagreement contained therein.  
With judges from all backgrounds and legal cultures having embraced the practice, and with few 
judgments and advisory opinions having been issued without a single AO attached to it, the practice 
of issuing AOs is an ingrained characteristic of the ICJ’s culture. Yet, there is not a clear and shared 
understanding of the significance of that practice. And, although the notion of authority is frequently 
invoked when discussing the effect of AOs by both critics and defenders of the practice, what aspect 
of the Court’s authority they risk offending or enhancing, and how, is rarely explained. Consequently, 
existing attempts to evaluate those views on their own terms prove fruitless. With this in mind, the 
following section lays out the understanding of ‘judicial authority’ upon which my argument is 
premised.  
1.2. Judicial Authority 
For the purposes of this paper ‘authority’ is understood in terms of Max Weber’s conception of 
‘authority’ or ‘domination’, that is, as the ‘legitimate exercise of power’.32 Power denotes ‘the 
probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will, 
despite resistance’.33 ‘Legitimacy’ is understood in the sense of political legitimacy, namely ‘the 
                                                          
Rica Along the San Juan River and Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica) Judgment of 16 
December 2015 [2015] ICJ Rep 665 (Judges Tomka, Greenwood Sebutinde and Judge ad hoc Dugard, Declaration; Judge ad hoc Dugard, 
Separate Opinion). While this a more recent development in the culture of judicial practice within the Court – the beginning of this current 
trend marked by Legality of the Use of Force¸ Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 15 December [2004] ICJ Rep 1011 ( Vice-President Ranjeva, 
Judges Guillaume, Higgins, Kooijmans, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal and Elaraby, Joint Declaration; Judge Higgins, Separate Opinion; Judge 
Kooijmans, Separate Opinion; Judge Elaraby, Separate Opinion) – it is not without historical precedent: See Right of Passage over Indian 
Territory (Portugal v. India) Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 12 April 1960 [1960] ICJ Rep 6 (Judges Winiarski and Badawi-Pasha, Joint 
Dissenting Opinion; Judge Badawi-Pasha, Declaration) and Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Iceland) Merits, Judgment of 25 July 1974 [1974] ICJ 
Rep 3 (Judges Forster, Bengzon, Jiménez de Aréchaga, Nagendra Singh and Ruda, Joint Separate Opinion; Judge Nagendra Singh, Declaration) 
and in Fisheries Jurisdiction (Germany v. Iceland) Merits, Judgment of 25 July 1974 [1974] ICJ Rep 175 (Judges Forster, Bengzon, Jiménez de 
Aréchaga, Nagendra Singh and Ruda, Joint Separate Opinion; Judge Nagendra Singh, Declaration). 
29 Such factors include the order of priority attached to opinions with different labels when published in the Court’s official records (see G. 
Guyomar, Commentaire de Réglement de la Cour Internationale de Justice (1983), 610, cited by G. Guillaume, ‘Les Declarations Jointes aux 
Decisions de la Cour Internationale de Justice’, in J. Ruda and C. Armas Barea (Eds), Liber Amicorum “In Memoriam’ of Judge José Maríe Ruda 
(2000), 426-7. 
30 R. Jennings, ‘The Collegiate Responsibility and the Authority of the International Court of Justice’, in Y. Dinstein (ed) International Law at a 
Time of Perplexity (1989), 348 and Hernández supra note 6, at 97. 
31 The use of the language of ‘dissent’ can invoke the political connotations associated with that language, in turn influencing how the opinion, 
its author, and their relationship to the Court’s judgment is perceived. See R. Jennings, ‘The Internal Judicial Practice of the International Court 
of Justice’ (1988) 59 BYBIL 32, at 46 explaining how some judges avoid invoking the language of ‘dissent’ to describe their opinions and 
Guillaume supra note 29, at 433 explaining how the author preferred to style their opinions as ‘declarations’ in order to avoid having to invoke 
the connotations associated with ‘dissenting’ and ‘separate’. 
32 M. Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (1978), Vol. I, at 212 et seq. 
33 Ibid. at 53. 
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process through which both political power and obedience are justified’.34 On this basis, ‘legitimacy’ 
is defined as ‘the governed recognizing the right of the governors to lead and, to a certain extent, their 
entitlement to the perks of power’.35 According to this view, ‘what makes a certain practice of power 
legitimate is the process through which authority justifies its exercise of power and gains social 
acceptance’.36 There exist a multitude of conceptions of legitimacy premised upon different processes 
or bases for justification. When speaking of institutional (judicial or otherwise) legitimacy, these 
conceptions may be grouped into three clusters: ‘consent legitimacy’, ‘input legitimacy’ and ‘output 
legitimacy’.37 Familiar conceptions of consent legitimacy may include state consent and democratic 
legitimacy.38 By contrast, input legitimacy encompasses different dimensions of process or procedural 
legitimacy, including: deliberative legitimacy, participatory legitimacy, representative legitimacy, 
independence, accountability, compliance with ‘due process’ norms, legality, compliance with human 
rights, or the attributes of officials (e.g. expertise, experience, personal characteristics, impartiality, 
independence, individual values).39 Finally output legitimacy concerns results-based legitimacy and 
the extent to which the outcomes of the institutional process achieve the functions attributed to the 
institution.40 While it is impossible to be certain what ‘ideas at the back of their heads’ animated 
existing contributions to discourse around AOs and judicial authority, the application of the conceptual 
framework offered in this section to those contributions demonstrates how discourse around AOs and 
authority can be seen as implicating and interacting with a number of these conceptions of normative 
legitimacy in different ways. 
This conception of authority applies equally to judgments of the Court and to AOs. As platforms for 
the public expression of individual judicial views AOs are a vehicle through which individual judges can 
persuade or assert influence in the public sphere. Consequently, they are expressions of individual 
judicial power, and – to the extent that they are accepted as legitimate – expressions of individual 
judicial authority (individual opinions) or the pooling of the individual authorities of multiple judges 
(joint opinions). As such, discourse on the relationship between AOs and judicial authority is one 
aspect of the broader issue of the interaction between individual judicial authority and institutional 
judicial authority, and more broadly, the role of the individual judge within international law. While 
                                                          
34 J-M Coicaud, ‘Legitimacy, Across Borders and Over Time’, in H. Charlesworth and J-M Coicard (eds) Faultlines of International Legitimacy 
(2010), 17. 
35 Ibid. 
36 M. Radsen, ‘Sociological Approaches to International Courts’, in C. Romano, K. Alter and Y. Shany (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International 
Adjudication (2014), 392. See also S. Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal 
Studies (1989). 
37 A useful review of the field can be found in D. Bodansky, ‘Legitimacy in International Law and International Relations’, in J. Dunoff and M. 
A. Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (2013). 
38 Ibid., at 330. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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the focus here is externally oriented – i.e. the authority in the public sphere – as Section 4 illustrates, 
AOs (for consumption in that public sphere) also strike at the heart of the dynamic between the 
individual judge and the collective in the course of internal deliberations.41 Moreover, conceiving AOs 
as expressions of individual judicial authority helps us focus upon those attributes of AOs that 
distinguish them from other expressions of disagreement with a Court’s decision, such as criticisms 
issued by individuals not holding the office of judge of the Court (e.g. state representatives, scholars, 
civil society actors). The capacity in which AOs are issued grants them what Weber referred to as 
‘charismatic authority’:42 the contentiousness of AOs lies not simply in the fact that they are the 
expression of difference or of disagreement, but rather in that they are authored by a judge, and 
specifically a judge who participated in the case at hand.43  
Authority, and particularly its quality of being an accepted expression of power by a social actor, is 
particularly important in the context of international justice. Given the geopolitical realities of the 
international sphere – the primacy of the state as the principal unit of action and the dependence of 
international courts and tribunals upon the consent and cooperation of states to function – 
international courts and tribunals have weak ‘power’, that being the ability to enforce their will 
despite resistance and without consent of the affected parties. Thus, international courts and tribunals 
rely especially upon the acceptance of their legitimacy as institutions and the legitimacy of their 
decisions to secure the compliance and cooperation necessary for their operation and the effective 
discharge of their functions.44 Against this backdrop, the lack of sustained study of the institutional 
and systemic implications of AOs upon institutional legitimacy (and, in turn, authority) is surprising. 
2. The Perceived Negative Effect of Additional Opinions 
All parties to the Court’s Statute have accepted the formal criteria for the legitimacy of decision-
making, including the quorum for decision-making,45 the publication of the names of the judges who 
participated in the case,46 and the right of judges to issue AOs.47 Nevertheless, the sentiment that AOs 
are harmful to the Court’s authority is one that has persisted since the drafting of the Statute of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (the ICJ’s predecessor),48 and prior to that the negotiations 
around the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.49 In this section I elaborate upon this view, 
                                                          
41 See below, Section 4. 
42 Weber supra note 32, at 241. 
43 M-C Belleau and R. Johnson, ‘I Beg to Differ: Interdisciplinary Questions About Law, Language and Dissent’, in L. Atkinson and D. Majury 
(eds) Law, Mystery and the Humanities: Collected Essays (2008), 177. 
44 Bodansky supra note 37. 
45 Art. 55(1) ICJ Statute. 
46 Art. 56(2) ICJ Statute. 
47 Art. 57 ICJ Statute. 
48 PCIJ, Documents Concerning the Action Taken by the Council of the League of Nations under Art. 14 and the Adoption by the Assembly of 
the Statute of the Permanent Court (January 1921), at 24. 
49 For discussion, see Hussein supra note 7. 
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before using the remainder of the article to explain why these sentiments, at least premised upon the 
assumptions that they appear to be, are misguided. 
This view is epitomised by Kammerhofer who states that in the absence of ‘a secure political 
organization, a separation of powers, and effective enforcement of its judgements by the executive 
branch’ the ICJ depends upon ‘the persuasiveness of its pronouncements’ and consequently it ‘cannot 
afford to have ‘in-house’, ‘official’ critics’.50 Although domestic courts may face similar difficulties 
when faced with inducing compliance by the Executive, international courts and tribunals lack the 
tradition of acceptance and habitual respect for their decisional authority typically associated with 
domestic courts. National judiciaries are able to establish their credentials as competent decision-
makers in the context of ‘mundane’ or non-controversial cases.51 However international courts and 
tribunals – particularly the ICJ – often deal with highly politicised and much contested ‘big cases’, 
placing judicial authority under further strain.52 Yet, it is often these very cases – perhaps, in part 
because of their magnitude or sensitivity – that are accompanied by the greatest number of AOs.53 
Thus, concern as to the fragility of international judicial authority is understandable. Using the 
conceptualisation of authority set out in the previous section, the remainder of this section will 
examine how ‘in-house’ criticisms in the form of AOs can be perceived to undermine institutional 
legitimacy. 
2.1. Output Legitimacy 
Whether speaking of the Court’s decisional authority or of its interpretive authority, authority-based 
arguments against AOs may be underpinned by the belief that the revelation of the existence of 
disagreement between judges casts doubt upon the substantive correctness of the Court’s decision. 
From the perspective of the Court’s dispute resolution function, the publication of disagreement 
between the judges on the applicable law and how it applies to the facts of the dispute weakens the 
Court’s claim to have resolved the dispute. That then diminishes the perceived output legitimacy of 
                                                          
50 Kammerhofer supra note 2, at 716. 
51 ‘Report of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee on the Future of the Permanent Court of International Justice’ (10/02/1944) available at 
(1945) 39 AJILS 1 at para.81(a); T. Franck, Judging the World Court (1986), 11.  
52 R. Falk, Reviving the World Court (1986); K. Highet, ‘Reflections on Jurisprudence for the “Third World”: The World Court, the “Big Case”, 
and the Future’ (1986-87) 27 Virginia Journal of International Law 287. Certainly, not all proceedings before the Court have the political 
sensitivity of, say, the South West Africa proceedings, the proceedings in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, the 
cases emanating out of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, or the advisory opinions in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 [1996] ICJ Rep 226 and Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 
Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004 [2004] ICJ Rep 136. Nevertheless, all cases have differing degrees of political sensitivity to a wider or narrower 
class of interested stakeholders that will impact upon how the Court’s authority is perceived by those stakeholders in any given case. 
53 Indeed, the judgment that prompted Kammerhofer’s critique of judicial practice (supra note 2) – Oil Platforms (supra note 19) – was 
accompanied by 11 opinions. More recently, the three judgments issued in the Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to the Cessation 
of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament proceedings brought by the Marshall Islands against Pakistan ([2016] ICJ Rep 552), 
India ([2016] ICJ Rep 225), and the United Kingdom ([2016] ICJ Rep 883) each had 14 individual opinions attached to the respective judgments, 
and Application on the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia) Merits, Judgment of 3 
February 2015 [2015] ICJ Rep 3 had 12 individual opinions attached.  
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the Court’s decision and likelihood of compliance with it by the parties. Within those judicial systems 
that provide for appellate review of decisions, AOs – even those that disagree fundamentally with the 
Court’s judgment – might encourage disappointed parties to continue engagement with the judicial 
process by seeking appellate review, equipped with the AOs.54 In the absence of any system for 
appellate review at the ICJ, AOs may have the opposite effect: they may validate a party’s sense of 
grievance and reinforce any decision not to comply with the Court’s decision.55 However, this 
argument is not limited to the (non)compliance decision. Owing to the essentially consent-based 
nature of the Court’s jurisdiction as defined by Article 36 of its Statute, states have the opportunity at 
an earlier stage of proceedings to determine whether they will accept and comply with the Court’s 
judgments and orders in any case that arises.56 Thus, when considering the effect of AOs upon the 
Court’s decisional authority, not only is it necessary to consider their impact upon the decisional 
authority of the particular judgment to which they are attached (particular decisional authority), but 
also their impact upon the Court’s general decisional authority and the manner in which states engage 
with any proceedings brought before the Court. 
From the perspective of the Court’s interpretive authority, although the ICJ’s judgments do not 
constitute a formal source of international law, its decisions nevertheless constitute a subsidiary 
means of determining the law.57 In light of the diversity of the Court’s composition, intended to be 
representative of the international community of states, an articulation of a rule of customary 
international law by the Court may hold a high degree of authority for this purpose.58 Added to this 
the institutional and systemic position of the Court as the ‘principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations’, belief in the Court’s authoritative potential in terms of the clarification and development of 
international law has long been held.59 Turning to the interpretive authority of particular judgments 
of the Court, therefore, in light of the infrequency of disputes and questions submitted to the Court, 
such that the Court rarely obtains the opportunity to revisit the same legal question, every statement 
on the law by the Court in its decisions holds considerable authoritative potential.60 AOs that highlight 
weaknesses or shortcomings in the Court’s interpretation of the law in a judgment – whether treaty-
                                                          
54 W. Brennan, ‘In Defense of Dissents’ (1985-1986) 37 Hastings Law Journal 427, 430. 
55 Advisory Committee of Jurists, Documents Presented to the Committee Relating to Existing Plans for the Establishment of a Permanent Court 
of International Justice (September 1920), Draft Scheme Prepared by the Committee Appointed by the Danish Government at 209.  
56 On the complex matter of compliance with ICJ judgments, see generally, C. Schulte, Compliance with Decisions of the International Court of 
Justice (2004), C. Paulson, ‘Compliance with Final Judgments of the International Court of Justice’ (2004) 98 AJIL 434, and A. Llamzon, 
‘Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court of Justice (2007) 18 EJIL 815. 
57 Art. 38(1)(d) ICJ Statute. 
58 Going further, see Barcelona Traction case, supra note 23 (Judge Fitzmaurice, Separate Opinion) at Para.2.  
59 H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (1958).  
60 The Court has been able to revisit its caselaw in some areas (e.g. maritime and territorial delimitation), resulting in the opportunity for 
routinisation in those areas. In turn, the authoritative potential of articulations of law in such areas of law is greater.  
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based or customary – can weaken the degree of consensus that crystallises around that interpretation 
within the wider international law-making and interpreting community.  
2.2. Input Legitimacy 
From the perspective of input legitimacy, that primarily concerns process, a traditional critique of AOs 
is that undermine what critics refer to as ‘secrecy’.61 Secrecy is an attribute of the judicial process 
designed to preserve and promote the actual and/or perceived independence and impartiality of 
individual judges.62 The independence of the judiciary goes to the heart of the rule of law and is central 
to the notion of the administration of justice, distinguishing the politics of law and legalism from other 
forms of politics, as well as other forms of third party dispute settlement.63 The independence of 
judges – whether speaking of judicial institutions or the individual judges within the institution – is a 
principal criterion of input legitimacy and, in turn, a key source of authority. Thus, even when not 
expressed explicitly in terms of authority, ‘secrecy’-based critiques of AOs strike to the heart of 
institutional authority. 
The arguments advanced in favour of prohibiting, particularly, national judges and ad hoc judges from 
issuing AOs during the negotiation of the PCIJ Statute and deliberations upon amendments to its Rules 
of Procedure illustrate how and why AOs can be perceived to undermine secrecy, judge’s 
independence and their capacity to decide cases impartially and, in turn, authority. Initially, the fear 
was underpinned by the belief that that judges would always vote against decisions unfavourable to 
their appointing state and use AOs to record the fact and nature of their disapproval.64 In turn, this 
would create the impression of partiality, thereby undermining the independence-based legitimacy of 
the Court and its constituent members. Later the argument shifted: rather than potentially revealing 
latent partiality, AOs were viewed as a mechanism through which states could exert pressure on 
national judges and thereby undermine their independence: the prohibition of AOs would ‘shield the 
judge from the reproaches of national public opinion’.65 More recently, in a broader defence of the 
secrecy of deliberations, Bruno Simma and Thore Neumann explained that the justification for such 
                                                          
61 In the context of the PCIJ/ICJ, see Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee (June-July 1920) at 
531, 570 and 591-2.  
62 It can be manifested in different degrees and in different ways: from the complete anonymity of the identity of judges and the suppression 
of the publication of any information that may reveal their identity, to the suppression of the publication of information that may reveal the 
views of any individual judges, to on the other end of the spectrum, the suppression of any information that may reveal the content of the 
Court’s internal deliberations. 
63 A. Bogdandy and I. Venzke, In Whose Name: A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication (2014), 159; F. Mégret, ‘International Judges’ 
and Experts’ Impartiality and the Problem of Past Declarations’ (2011) 10 LPICT 31 at 42; J. Shaman, ‘The Impartial Judge: Detachment or 
Passion’ (1995) 45 DePaul Law Review 610; J.-Shklar,-Legalism-( 1964); R. Mackenzie, C. Romano and P. Sands, Selecting International Judges: 
Principle, Process, and Politics (2010), at 10; Advisory Committee of Jurists, Documents Presented to the Committee Relating to the Existing 
Plans for the Establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice (September 1920), Appendix to Memorandum Presented by the 
Legal Section of the Permanent Secretariat of the League of Nations’ at 113. 
64 Advisory Committee of Jurists Procès-Verbaux (1920) supra note 61, at 531 and 570. 
65 Ibid., at 743; Committee of Jurists on the Statute of the PCIJ (‘PCIJ Committee of Jurists’), Minutes (May 1929) at 50. 
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secrecy is to prevent governments from ‘monitoring the discursive behaviour of individual judges, [and 
seeking] to influence them by indirectly ‘disciplining’ their discursive ‘inputs’ and by using information 
from the deliberations to thwart a judge’s re-election’.66 Duncan French, for example, has suggested 
that Judge Weeramantry’s failure to secure re-election for a second term office may have been 
influenced by the stance he maintained on a number of legal and political issues in his ICJ AOs.67 
Moving beyond independence, an opinion that implicitly or explicitly suggests that the Court’s 
decision was reached without full due consideration of all issues raised by the case as perceived by 
the authoring judge may call into question the deliberative legitimacy of the Court’s decision.68 It can 
be seen, therefore, that AOs may be perceived to impact upon input and output institutional 
legitimacy in several detrimental ways, all of which may lie behind claims that AOs undermine 
institutional authority. As explained in the following section, this is just one account of the relationship 
between AOs, legitimacy, and institutional authority. The validity of these claims – and indeed, any 
accounts of this relationship – depends upon the institutional context within which they are made and 
the structure of institutional authority therein.  
3. The Structure of Authority 
In his seminal study, The Faces of Justice and State Authority,69 Mirjan Damaška offered a theoretical 
model that illustrates the relationship between procedural design and practice, official authority, and 
the purposes for which that authority is exercised. To understand the relationship between a 
particular process or practice (such as issuing AOs) and the authority of the institution, Damaška’s 
theory suggests that it is necessary to situate that practice within the wider systemic context – 
considering the range of factors embodied within his matrix of idealtypes and their implications for 
each other. In particular, he explained how attitudes towards AOs are the product of the structure 
and organisation of authority in the context of which those attitudes are formed.70 That structure is 
determined by three categories of attributes of the justice system under question: i) the attributes of 
the decision-makers; ii) the distribution of authority within the institution among the decision-makers; 
and iii) the legitimate criteria for decision-making. However, when those attitudes are taken out of 
                                                          
66 T. Neumann and B. Simma, ‘Transparency in International Adjudication’, in A. Bianchi and A. Peters (eds) Transparency in International Law 
(2013), 457.  
67 D. French, ‘The Heroic Undertaking? The Separate and Dissenting Opinions of Judge Weeramantry during his Time on the Bench of the 
International Court of Justice’ (2006) 11 AYBIL 35 at 41, referring to Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium) Request for 
the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999 [1999] ICJ Rep 124 (Judge Weeramantry, Dissenting Opinion) and Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion supra note 52 (Judge Weeramantry, Dissenting Opinion). 
68 Questioning the fullness of ‘collegiate discussion’ in the case at hand see Barcelona Traction case, supra note 23, (Judge Fitzmaurice, 
Separate Opinion) at Para.37. 
69 Damaška supra note 12. 
70 Ibid., at 19 and 24. 
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the systemic context in which they were developed and transplanted into another, the validity of that 
transplant depends on the fit within that new context.71 
Arguments of the kind canvassed in Section 2, that the expression of individual judicial authority in 
the form of AOs is incompatible with institutional legitimacy, are most consistent with those systems 
of justice that bear the characteristics of Damaška’s ‘hierarchical idealtype’ of authority. The 
hierarchical idealtype is typified by: i) a professionalised body of official decision-makers, ii) who are 
organised hierarchically and among whom official authority is distributed widely and vertically, from 
the top down,72 and iii) wherein the style of decision-making can be characterised as two variants 
upon legalistic – pragmatic legalism and logical legalism.73 The professionalised system of official 
decision-making refers to a system of permanent officials, who over time and experience in the same 
or similar role carve out a sphere of practice.74 In turn, this provides for the routinisation and 
specialisation of decision-making, namely the ability to address issues in a general, rather than 
individualised, manner by uniformly applying a narrow range of decision-making criteria.75 The vertical 
distribution of decision-making within a pyramid of authority sees decision-making at lower levels 
subject to superior review.76 Combined with the routinised and specialised characteristics of a 
professionalised body of decision-makers, the strict hierarchisation of this model of decision-making 
affords little room for official discretion in the exercise of authority.77 Accordingly, the exercise of 
decision-making power is subject to a comprehensive system of institutional and professionalised 
accountability. 
Damaška explicitly addressed the implications of the professionalisation of decision-making upon the 
approach towards the expression of individual views, in the form of AOs. Because the professional 
decision-maker is expected to decouple their personal views from their official function, 
[j]udgments become pronouncements of an impersonal entity (a curia) even where 
a single individual is entrusted with their rendition. And because the institution must 
be univocal so as not to be equivocal, the announcement of a judgment made by 
several officials nullifies prior internal dissent: those who disagree must now repress 
their feelings.78 
                                                          
71 On ‘legal transplants’ and the importance of systemic ‘fit’ see D. Nelken, ‘Towards a Sociology of Legal Transplantation’, in D. Nelken and J. 
Feest (eds) Adapting Legal Cultures (2001), 14. 
72 Damaška supra note 12, at 18-23. 
73 Ibid., at 21-23. 
74 Ibid., at 21. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid., at 20. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., at 19. 
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If made in the context of a legal system tending towards the hierarchical idealtype, the authority-
based criticisms of ICJ AOs seem logical and consistent with the attributes of the system wherein the 
expression of individual judicial authority is inconsistent with institutional judicial authority.79 
However, evaluating the ICJ in accordance with the aforementioned three categories of attributes, it 
can be seen that the ICJ bears few of the structural characteristics of the hierarchical idealtype of 
authority. Rather, the ICJ bears closer resemblance to what Damaška characterises as the ‘coordinate 
idealtype’ – characterised by temporary, non-professional decision-makers, appointed for non-
permanent periods of time and without any specific specialist training to equip them for official 
decision-making in the post they hold.80 Judicial decision-makers within the coordinate idealtype join 
the bench after a lengthy career and do so from a diversity of backgrounds. While they are not ‘lay’ in 
the general sense of the word, coordinate decision-makers are lay in that they have not received a 
rigorous and uniform education and training in ‘being a judge’. Instead, the diversity that lay decision-
makers bring to the judiciary due to the diversity of their previous careers, experiences and 
backgrounds is considered a quality that makes them qualified to be a judge (e.g. as practitioners, 
politicians or diplomats, academics).81 Consequently, the decision-making traits of specialisation and 
routinisation are unlikely to take hold. It follows that there is greater opportunity for flexibility and an 
individualised approach to justice. The coordinate ideal is typified by ‘a wide distribution of authority 
among roughly equal lay officials; with no one clearly superior to others, there is essentially a single 
stratum of authority’.82 Whereas predictability and objectivity is ensured in the hierarchical model by 
the application of ‘textually fixed rules’, authority in the coordinate model ‘depends upon the clarity 
of consensus in the community or in the dominant group’.83 
The individual attributes and professional experience of ICJ judges,84 the diversity of their background 
and identities and the acknowledgement of the benefits that this diversity can bring,85 as well as the 
appointment of ad hoc judges86 are all factors that push the ICJ towards the coordinate idealtype of 
justice. While judges may be appointed to the Court bearing in mind their pre-existing experience and 
                                                          
79 Indeed, it might be argued that within hierarchically structured systems, beyond the courtroom individual judges do not possess authority 
as the expression of individual judicial power within those systems is not considered legitimate. 
Damaška supra note 12, at 24. 
81 And this established and reputed experience and expertise may furnish the individual judge and their opinions with greater individual 
authority. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid., at 28. 
84 On the professional backgrounds of judges see Art. 2 and 13(1) ICJ Statute. Mackenzie, Romano and Sands supra note 63, at 51; D. Terris, 
C. Romano and I. Swigart, The International Judge: An Introduction to the Men and Women Who Decide the World’s Cases (2007), 20. 
85 On the diversity requirements for the Court’s composition as a whole, see Art. 9 ICJ Statute; Elias, supra note 22, at 23; M. Bedjaoui, ‘From 
an Oligarchic Law to a Law of Community’, in M. Bedjaoui (ed) International Law: Achievements and Prospects (1991), 5-11; A. Anghie, 
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Marking of International Law (2007), 198; G. Abi-Saab, 'The International Court as a World Court', in V. Lowe 
and M. Fitzmaurice (eds) Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice (1996); M. McWhinney The World Court and the Contemporary Law-
Making Process (1979); N. Singh, The Role and Record of the International Court of Justice (1989), 257. 
86 Art. 31 ICJ Statute,  
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expertise, once on the bench, the opportunities for specialisation and routinisation of decision-making 
to take hold are slim. The diversity in the factual and legal issues raised by cases and questions 
submitted to the Court owing to its general jurisdiction and the infrequency with which they are 
referred forces the Court to address directly and explicitly the individual and unique characteristics of 
each case on an ad hoc basis. The Court’s ‘flat’ structure consists of a single level of decision-making 
authority composed of and within a single body and no mechanism of appellate review, irrespective 
of whether the Court sits in plenary – as it does in the majority of its cases – or in Chamber formation.87 
In light of this single stratum of authority, the limited opportunity for formal career progression within 
the Court calls into doubt the existence of the hierarchical dynamics wherein ‘team playing’ and 
obtaining consensus is rewarded by promotion.88  
The ICJ’s characterisation under the third limb of the organisation of authority idealtypes – formal 
versus substantive justice as the legitimate basis for decision-making – is open to greater contention. 
On the one hand, Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute suggests that the only legitimate bases upon which 
decisions can be reached are those under Article 38(1) (a)-(c). However, in practice, the variance in 
methodologies for the interpretation of treaties and the identification of custom – which in turn result 
in potentially great disparities in outcome – mean that a formalist conception of decision-making 
involving an appearance that this involves the simple identification and application of the applicable 
standard is not sustainable. The diversity of approaches towards decision-making represented by the 
judges of the Court – some maintaining a strict approach in favour of formal justice and some 
eschewing the boundaries of formalistic conceptions of justice in favour of more equitable approaches 
– means that it is impossible to ascertain a particular culture of decision-making of the institution as a 
whole. The diversity of legal and philosophical traditions represented through the diverse membership 
of the Court as required by Article 9 of the Court’s Statute suggests that it was never intended for the 
Court to adopt a single jurisprudential approach towards decision-making nor even to create the 
appearance of one. The diversity requirements under Article 9 combined with the authorisation 
provided by Article 38(1)(c) for individual judges to canvas the world’s array of legal traditions and 
cultures, synthesised by way of the inclusive process of internal deliberations together create a picture 
of institutional decision-making more consistent with Damaška’s coordinate idealtype than the 
hierarchical one. 
                                                          
87 See Arts. 26 and 27 ICJ Statute. 
88 It is undoubted that informal hierarchies may emerge and while there may be limited opportunities for career progression within the 
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institutions or regimes. 
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Again, Damaska addressed the implications of the coordinate characterisation for AOs. Whereas the 
judge in the hierarchical system is expected to decouple their personal identity from their 
professional, institutional, role, within the coordinate idealtype the personal and professional 
identities are inextricably interlinked.89 Thus, within coordinately structured justice systems such as 
the ICJ, the individual – and the individuality of – judges are not only consistent with institutional 
authority but are a legitimising attribute of the institution itself. In the absence of the checks and 
balances upon the exercise of institutional power that exist within hierarchical systems, the exercise 
of institutional power is held more directly accountable to: i) the sense of personal-professional 
responsibility and reputational concerns of the individual judges who are personally associated with 
the judgment,90 and ii) the legitimacy-appraising actors. Such accountability is facilitated through the 
adoption of modalities of transparency.91 These have the effects of highlighting the personal-
professional responsibility of the individual judges for the institution’s decision and of providing the 
information that external actors require to substantively appraise the legitimacy of the institution and 
its judgments. One such modality are AOs. Focusing upon their effect upon the appraisal of 
institutional and decisional legitimacy by external stakeholders, the following section will explore how 
the individual authority of judges expressed through AOs interacts with institutional and decisional 
authority within the ICJ as a coordinately structured system of authority.  
4. Additional Opinions Within the Co-Ordinately Structured ICJ 
The previous section explained how, in the absence of the structural guarantors of legitimacy 
characteristic of hierarchical systems, coordinately structured systems of authority place greater 
emphasis upon the assessment of the substantive legitimacy of the exercise of institutional power by 
the Court by external stakeholders. Structural and procedural mechanisms are thus required to 
facilitate the appraisal of both the input and the output legitimacy of expressions of institutional 
powers by those external stakeholders. AOs are one such mechanism, and through the tension that is 
reached between the authority claimed by (and, as this section will argue, for) the institution and the 
individual judicial authority embodied by AO, the legitimacy of the expression of institutional power 
at any given time and for any given purpose can be established.  
                                                          
89 Damaška supra note 12, at 27. 
90 For example, see Barcelona Traction case, supra note 23 (Judge Tanaka, Separate Opinion) and more recently, the recital made by Judge 
Cançado Trindade at the beginning of all his AOs in justification of the opinion that follows. E.g. Alleged Violation of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, 
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) Request of Provisional Measures, Order of 3rd 
October 2018 (not yet published), (Judge Cançado Trindade, Separate Opinion), at para.3: 
I feel thus obliged to leave on the records, in the present Separate Opinion, the identification of such issues and the foundations 
of my own personal position thereon. I do so, once again under the merciless pressure of time, moved by the sense of duty in 
the exercise of the international judicial function. 
91 On the triumvirate of judicial independence, judicial transparency and judicial accountability, see J. Dunoff and M. Pollack, ‘The Judicial 
Trilemma’ (2017) 111 AJIL 225. 
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Consequently, within both coordinate and hierarchical contexts AOs should be understood as having 
potentially the same effect: that is, as a constraint upon the institutional authority. The difference lies 
in how that effect is conceived. Whereas within hierarchical systems this is perceived to be a negative 
constraint, within coordinate systems it is considered one of constructive restraint, and the fact that 
they exist as a potential restraint itself being a legitimising attribute of the Court’s procedure. The 
relationship between AOs and institutional authority is constructive in other ways: as this section will 
demonstrate, they hold the potential to reinforce both input and output legitimacy. They fulfil these 
functions in at least two (often, but not always, related) ways: one formal and expressive, and the 
other substantive. In some instances, the effect of AOs upon the appraisal of institutional legitimacy 
lies simply in the fact of their existence and possibility as institutional practice, irrespective of the 
substantive way in which they are (not) used by individual judges. In other instances, in addition to 
what they represent, their significance also lies in what they say: their effect upon the appraisal of 
institutional legitimacy lies also (or predominantly) in the substantive views expressed therein. The 
remainder of this section will elaborate upon these ideas and will explain how, specifically, AOs act 
upon how institutional legitimacy is appraised. 
4.1. Output Legitimacy 
There are two principal ways in which AOs can influence the appraisal of the output legitimacy of the 
Court’s judgment, which in turn will affect the Court’s decisional and interpretive authority. In the first 
instance, AOs are conceived as a supportive force: one that strengthens the claim to output legitimacy. 
In the second instance, the force exerted upon institutional and decisional legitimacy can work either 
way: they can be supportive, but they can also be forces of institutional – and necessary – restraint.  
First, not only are AOs an expression of the Court’s representative legitimacy (supporting the claim to 
general decisional authority) but, as Andreas Paulus has suggested, they can also enhance the Court’s 
output legitimacy by appealing to, and expressing, the value-based legitimacy criteria held by parties 
to the dispute and, more widely, stakeholders within the international law-interpreting community.92 
In doing so, they support the Court’s claim to both particular and general decisional authority.93 An 
example of this might include Judge Ammoun’s separate opinion in Western Sahara, which concurred 
with the Court’s conclusion that the territory of Western Sahara was not terra nullius at the time of 
Spanish colonisation.94 However Judge Ammoun reached that conclusion not on the basis of an 
analysis of the practice of those states recognised as ‘civilised nations’ at the time of colonisation (as 
                                                          
92 A. Paulus, ‘International Adjudication’, in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds) The Philosophy of International Law (2010), 219-220.  
93 See Gleider Hernández (supra note 6, at 124) who concludes that ‘the Court’s practice of publishing individual opinions is part of its claim 
for the wider authority of its judgments, not vis-à-vis the parties before it but with respect to the wider audience’. 
94 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975 [1975] ICJ Rep 12 (Vice-President Ammoun, Separate Opinion).  
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had the Court) but rather on the basis of African philosophical and legal thought, drawing upon a 
spiritual understanding of the relationship between humanity and the land, recalling notions of 
ancestral ties, rather than territorial control.95 More recently, Judge Cançado Trindade, while voting 
in favour of the Court’s dispositive paragraphs, frequently pens lengthy separate opinions that 
advance his human-centric conception of international law as the basis and rationale for the 
conclusion with which he concurred.96 
Furthermore, judges may use AOs to supplement the Court’s reasoning and in so doing enhance its 
clarity and aid full understanding of how and why the Court reached its judgment. This lends support 
to the both the Court’s general and particular decisional authority. ICJ judges have described the 
Court’s judgment as a composite of the views of each of the judges aligned in the majority, rather than 
the articulation of a singular comprehensive judgment of ‘the Court’.97 In turn, legal scholars and ICJ 
judges alike have observed how AOs restore the ‘conceptual richness and colour’ of the Court’s 
pronouncements,98 which in turn aide appreciation of the judgment, how and why it came about, and 
its implications.99 This has led some to refer to the ‘indissoluble’100 relationship between AOs and the 
Courts’ judgments, one where they ‘belong to each other, and ideally, illuminate each other’,101 
perhaps by serving as a foil to the Court’s reasoning.102  
This idea that AOs can act as a foil to the Court’s reasoning takes us to the second way in which AOs 
influence the appraisal of the Court’s institutional and decisional output legitimacy. In the absence of 
any appellate process, AOs allow external stakeholders to evaluate the substantive merits of the 
Court’s judgment in light of alternative possibilities and in turn affirm the superiority (or, perhaps, 
inferiority) of the judgment over possible alternatives.103 Thus in addition to exposing the Court’s 
judgment to more rigorous scrutiny, AOs expose the authoring judge’s reasoning to scrutiny for the 
purposes of ascertaining whether their disagreement or divergence from the position adopted by the 
Court was well founded. To the extent that AOs do directly or indirectly alert external stakeholders to 
deficiencies in the Court’s judgments, AOs should restrain the output legitimacy of the Court’s 
                                                          
95 Ibid. at 85-87.  
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Humanized International Law: A Collection of Individual Opinions (1991-2013) (2015). 
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judgments, and – in turn – its claim to authority regarding those deficient matters. This constructive 
restraint is particularly important in the context of the Court’s interpretive authority.  
In the context of international law, the degree to which any given proposition of law asserted by the 
ICJ is accepted as an accurate and authoritative articulation of the law is determined by the wider law-
interpreting community on an articulation by articulation basis.104 As such, AOs – rather than being 
viewed as harmful to the Court’s authority – should properly be understood as being a mechanism 
that assists the law-interpreting community when making that determination. Support for this 
conception of the institutional function of AOs can be found in the views expressed by participants in 
both the drafting of the PCIJ Statute105 and the negotiations on the amendments to the rules of 
court,106 and more recently in the extra-judicial writings of former ICJ judges.107 It is implicit – even – 
in the pre-judicial observation of a current ICJ judge that ‘a decision [of the Court], especially if 
unanimous or near unanimous, may play a catalytic role in the development of the law’.108 Beyond the 
Court, this view has also gained traction within the wider law-interpreting community.109 Indeed, one 
only needs to consider the context in which Kammerhofer’s critique of AOs was made: in the 
conclusion to a critical case comment on the Court’s judgment in Oil Platforms. As he observed, 
‘[a]nyone who reads the separate and dissenting opinions is made very much aware of the 
shortcomings of the present judgement [sic]’.110 If one were to accept that the shortcomings as 
perceived by the authors of the AOs are indeed shortcomings of the Court’s judgment, then the degree 
of authority enjoyed by the judgment should reflect those shortcomings. 
While, as noted above, there is certainly a legitimising value to consensus,111 whether that be 
evidenced by unanimity or near unanimity in the Court’s vote or in the lesser disagreement expressed 
by judges with the decision – that value is only rendered possible by the opportunity for the expression 
of disagreement. Thus, desire for, and pursuit of, unanimity should not be confused with the creation 
of a fiction of unanimity through the adherence to a strong conception of secrecy. To shroud majority-
determined decisions with the cloak of unanimity with a view to bestowing upon it the 
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authoritativeness of actual consensus is simply misleading and risks stripping consensus (where it does 
exist) of the legitimising value it has. 
The authority-limiting potential of AOs is valuable not only from the perspective of constraining the 
interpretive authority claimed by the Court but is also important from the perspective of the authority 
claimed for the judgment by other political actors. As Karen Alter has observed, through their 
jurisprudence international courts and tribunals influence political outcomes by  
‘empower[ing] those actors who have international law on their side, increasing their 
out of court leverage. [International courts and tribunals] then alter political 
outcomes by giving symbolic, legal, and political resources to compliance 
constituencies, ever-changing groups of actors that for a variety of reasons may 
prefer policies that cohere with international law’.112  
On this basis, Alter recognises international judges as being not only legal actors but also political 
actors. Acknowledging how judicial pronouncements can also empower other political actors (for 
example, by lending support to particular historical narratives or by delegitimising political 
opponents), AOs serve as a potential check on the use or abuse of judicial authority by other political 
actors. 
One can look to the Nuclear Weapons advisory proceedings by way of illustration.113 Devised and 
promoted by a coalition of (non-nuclear) States and NGOs ‘whose entire purpose was to achieve a 
political objective’,114 the request for an ICJ advisory opinion was motivated by the hope that the 
resulting opinion would strengthen ‘both governmental and civic anti-nuclear pressures’.115 While the 
14 AOs attached to the Court’s Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion diluted the authority of the Court’s 
opinion,116 that dilution was necessary for the preservation of the Court’s authority. Martti 
Koskeniemmi has described the international law-making as a process of consensus-building, that is, 
‘a hegemonic process in which some agent or institution has succeeded in making its position seem 
the universal or ‘neutral position’.117 On this view, there is no objective centre or neutral point 
independent of political arguments, but rather the centre-ground is actually an ever-contested ‘terrain 
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of irreducible adversity’.118 All law, he claimed, ‘is about lifting idiosyncratic (“subjective”) interests 
and preferences from the realm of the special to that of the general (“objective”) in which they lose 
their particular, political colouring and come to seem natural, necessary or even pragmatic’.119 This 
understanding of consensus forming and law-making may be applied to the analysis of decision-
making and judgment forming, and AOs. 
As the Court’s dispositive paragraphs and the AOs in Nuclear Weapons demonstrated, the ‘process of 
contestation’ or deliberation within the Court failed to reach a consensus, with the principal question 
determined by the President’s casting vote. In the absence of an emergence of a middle ground 
whereupon the law could be identified, for the Court to have bestowed upon one political position 
additional leverage by way of having the opinion of the Court ‘on its side’, would have resulted in a 
politicisation of the Court in a manner inconsistent with the nature of judicial authority. Instead, the 
number and strength of the AOs counteracted the assumed authority of the Court’s opinion, indicating 
that the process of contestation was still open and the outcome undecided. Rather than privileging 
one side in that contest, the Court through its advisory opinion and the accompanying AOs contributed 
to that ongoing process of contestation, by equipping those actors accepted as legitimate lawmakers 
on either side of the contest with juridical arguments supporting their positions.120 In this case, AOs 
served less as a means by which the authority of the Court is restricted, but as a restraint upon how 
the authority of the Court can be used (and/or abused) by other political actors. 
Finally, there is one important qualification to the argument advanced in this section,  concerning the 
constructive effect of the authority-limiting potential of AOs. It is possible that how individual judges 
use AOs may have a destructive effect upon judicial authority – both that of the individual judge and 
that of the institution. As I have argued elsewhere,121 although AOs are not inherently inconsistent 
with judicial authority (whether individual or institutional), the use of particular language in AOs, or 
the use of AOs to launch personal attacks against colleagues can be harmful to judicial authority by 
undermining collegiality and by undermining the charismatic authority of judges.122 For example, the 
image of judicial quarrelling generated by a number of AOs to the Nicaragua judgment that addressed 
allegations of partiality made by one judge against another,123 was neither in the interests of the 
institution or the individual judges concerned. Judges should be mindful of the grave consequences 
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for their own reputation as well as that of their colleagues and the institution when considering what 
they use their AOs to address and the way they express their concerns. 
4.2. Input Legitimacy 
Whereas critics of AOs in the context of international law point to the fragility of international judicial 
authority owing to the weak institutional power,124 the response of coordinately structured systems 
of authority is to emphasise those legitimising attributes that it does possess to maximise their 
legitimising effect. For the ICJ, its representative diversity is often posited as one of its greatest 
legitimising attributes.125 Beyond the courtroom AOs are the principal public manifestation of the ICJ 
judge: not only is the mere fact of AOs an expression of that diversity, but they offer an opportunity 
for judges to give substantive manifestation to the diversity of legal and philosophical traditions in the 
Court’s composition and to demonstrate the contribution of that diversity to the process and outcome 
of adjudication by the ICJ.126 
Beyond diversity, AOs can be an expression of the legitimising attributes of independence and 
impartiality. Whereas the logic of secrecy is preferred within hierarchically oriented systems to defend 
judges against threats to their independence or impartiality, within coordinate systems AOs are an 
expression of individual judicial independence and, more substantively, they offer judges the 
opportunity to demonstrate their own independence. In the absence of hierarchical mechanisms of 
oversight and accountability, and recalling the scepticism around the willingness and capacity of 
international judges to act independently and impartially,127 the policy of secrecy as implemented 
through the suppression of AOs would do little more than reduce the likelihood that any improper 
influence is uncovered. 
Not only do AOs offer judges the opportunity to express legitimising attributes, both theirs individually 
and – taken in sum – that of the institution, they invite external stakeholders to scrutinise the Court’s 
judgment (and the opinions of individual judges) in light of their content to evaluate the degree of 
independence and impartiality exhibited. Within coordinate systems that emphasise the role of 
external stakeholders in the substantive appraisal of legitimacy, this facilitative effect of AOs is 
particularly important. Although – and crucially – judges are free to determine whether to issue an AO 
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and, if so, on what matters to write,128 AOs hold the potential to uncover any undue pressure upon 
authoring judges by opening up the personal decision-making process of the authoring judge to the 
same kind of scrutiny to which the Court’s judgment is subjected and, in extreme circumstances, by 
existing as a platform for judicial whistleblowing.129 And, because they hold the potential to reveal 
latent partiality or improper influence upon the Court or upon individual judges, AOs have a 
prophylactic effect, discouraging the adoption of potentially delegitimising practices upon threat of 
their revelation in an AO should they occur.130 
Finally, both within coordinately structured systems of justice in general and within the ICJ specifically, 
there has been an understanding that the production of draft AOs (for consumption in the external 
deliberative sphere) enhances the quality of deliberation in the internal deliberative sphere, thereby 
enhancing the judgment’s claim to deliberative legitimacy. The production of written opinions – notes 
– by individual judges as the basis for internal judicial deliberations is an established part of the ICJ’s 
procedure.131 By requiring individual judges to formulate their own tentative positions and to commit 
them to writing for circulation among colleagues not only does this assist the deliberations of the 
Court by presenting a range of possible juridical solutions to the dispute at hand that can be then 
debated and compared, but also enhances personal deliberations of the individual judge. As 
deliberations progress and a majority position crystallises, the transformation of notes into draft 
minority opinions provide the emerging majority with a counterpoint against which to test the 
coherence and persuasive rigour of their argument.132 Being presented with a fully articulated 
alternative to the decision before it is rendered and made subject to public scrutiny provides an 
opportunity for the majority position to be clarified, modified, or strengthened in the face of 
weaknesses or matters arising in draft minority-judge authored opinions. The potential power of AOs 
in the internal deliberative sphere lies not only in their written form, but also – and perhaps more 
significantly – in the prospect of their publication and, in turn, their capacity to influence how the 
Court’s judgment is received and perceived in the external deliberative sphere.133 This dynamic is 
neatly encapsulated in an anecdote recounted by Hugh Thirlway, from his time working in the Court’s 
Registry. After Thirlway had alerted the Court’s drafting committee to an argument advanced by Judge 
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Oda in his draft dissenting opinion, the committee duly strengthened the Court’s reasoning to address 
the point in question. Thirlway recalls how Judge Oda, stated ‘‘in mock bitterness, ‘‘Mr. Thirlway, you 
keep moving the targets that I am firing at!”’, highlighting the constructive role that the prospect of 
the publication of credible critique can incentivise the strengthening of the Court’s judgment.134 
5. Conclusion 
Writing on dissent in a different context, Roland Bleiker has observed that dissent is a  
field of enquiry that has the potential to reveal far more about power and agency than 
one might think initially. The process of undermining authority says as much, for 
instance, about the values and function of the existing social and political order as it 
does about the urge to break out of it.135 
The same can be said for judicial dissent within the context of international adjudication. Our effort 
to understand the relationship between AOs – as expressions of dissent – and institutional authority 
has led to a broader enquiry into the very nature of institutional authority at the ICJ.  
AOs are not beyond reproach, both as a matter of principle and in terms of substantive practice. 
Nevertheless, I have proposed that those criticisms based upon the inherent nature of judicial 
authority are misconceived. When doing so, I have sought to articulate a more appropriate 
understanding of the relationship between AOs and the judgments to which they are appended. I 
argue not only in favour of the ‘mere’ consistency of AOs with the structure of the ICJ’s authority, but 
also in favour of their significance for the structural integrity of that authority. Considering this, it is 
important that judges and external stakeholders appreciate their roles and responsibilities of judges 
and other actors when authoring and engaging with AOs.  
Firstly, when exercising their discretion when deciding whether to issue an AO and on what matters, 
ICJ judges must do so mindful of the institutional context in which that discretion is being exercised. 
AOs do have consequences for institutional authority, but those consequences are contextually 
contingent. The Court’s composition is designed to reflect the principal legal systems and civilisations 
of the world and it is thus expected that judges will bring to the Court their views on AOs that have 
been informed by their prior experience and training. However, as I have argued in this paper, it would 
be incorrect to assume that those views may be transplanted to the ICJ context. Rather, judges should 
be guided in their use (or non-use) of AOs by an accurate understanding of their relationship to ICJ 
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authority. On the use of AOs as vehicles for accounts of the entire legal-philosophical outlook that 
informs the personal decision-making of a judge in the case,136 the discretion that judges retain in how 
they use AOs must be exercised with a similar mindfulness of the institutional function of AOs. Where 
the production of such opinions delay the Court’s proceedings owing to the time taken to produce 
such opinions and/or preventing them from contributing to the Court’s internal deliberations, this is 
neither in the interests of the Court nor the individual judge in question.137 Once a judge has 
established his or her legal-philosophical orientation on the judicial record, it is certainly questionable 
whether it is necessary for that judge to reproduce it in full in every opinion. Each AO does not exist 
in a vacuum: they will be read with knowledge of the author’s jurisprudential leanings and – in some 
cases – it will be their prior record that will have influenced their election to the Court.138 While it is 
not within the Court’s custom to cite or refer to AOs explicitly,139 it may be both in the interests of 
judicial economy and judicial transparency for greater cross referencing by individual judges to prior 
AOs (authored by themselves or by others) when they have influenced or informed the opinion at 
hand.140 
Secondly, ICJ judges enjoy a broad discretion over whether to issue an AO, and on what matters. How 
judges exercise that discretion will, affect the substantive contribution of AOs to the legitimacy-
appraising enterprise of external stakeholders. Given the coordinate structure of authority at the ICJ, 
the fact that judges are afforded an opportunity to issue AOs and that they exist as a mechanism of 
transparency is alone a legitimising attribute. Nevertheless, the full realisation of the legitimising 
attributes of AOs as a mechanism of transparency depends upon how they are used by judges and the 
extent to which they can be said to offer an accurate, if only ever partial, window into how the decision 
was reached. It is for this reason that this paper has emphasised the potential effects of AOs. 
Thirdly, this paper has highlighted the responsibility of external stakeholders to hold the exercise of 
institutional authority to account. Thus, more broadly, I join the calls for greater scholarly engagement 
with the work of the Court – including the work of its individual judges.141 Audiences may well be able 
to fully appraise the input and output legitimacy of the ICJ without recourse to AOs. However, they 
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are a resource that can aide that appraisal and when engaging with AOs, external stakeholders must 
do so on a contextually accurate understanding of their relationship to institutional authority. 
